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Abstract
This paper presents a uniﬁed framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium
in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in
which each player’s strategy generates direct or indirect aﬃne “spillover” eﬀects that
depend on the rank-order of her decision variable. These eﬀects arise in natural inter-
pretations of a number of important economic environments, as well as in classic con-
tests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals exhibit
inequality aversion or regret. We provide the closed-form solution for the symmetric
Nash equilibria of this class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve
for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models
of litigation, and a host of other contests.
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11 Introduction
This paper presents a uniﬁed framework for analyzing equilibrium in simultaneous-move,
two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player’s strategy
generates direct or indirect aﬃne “spillover” eﬀects that depend on the rank-order of her
decision variable. We show that these eﬀects arise in natural interpretations of a number of
important economic environments, including contests adapted to recent experimental and
behavioral models where individuals exhibit inequality aversion or regret. We provide a
characterization of symmetric equilibria (both pure and mixed), closed-form expressions for
these equilibria, and show how our results may be used to directly solve for equilibrium
behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models of litigation, and a
host of other games.
Rank-order contests are ubiquitous. These take the form of environments in which play-
ers choose nonnegative bids (which may be interpreted as a proposed payment, eﬀort, or
the commitment of other scarce resources that are non-refundable) whose rank-order dis-
continuously inﬂuences the probability of winning some prize. Classic examples include
homogeneous product Bertrand competition (Bertrand, 1883), in which the lowest price ﬁrm
“wins” the proﬁtf r o ms e l l i n gt od e m a n da tt h a tp r i c e ,a sw e l la sﬁrst and second-price auc-
tions (Vickrey, 1961), where the player who submits the highest bid wins the item and pays
either his own bid (in the ﬁrst-price auction) or the bid of the second-highest bidder (in the
second-price auction).
Many rank-order contests involve both winners and losers alike forfeiting payments. In a
ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, for instance, each player submits a non-refundable bid and only the
higher bidder receives a prize. The war-of-attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974) is a second-price
all-pay auction: The high bidder wins the prize and pays the amount bid by the second-
highest bidder. These forms of competition have been widely used to model activities as
diverse as patent and R&D races, lobbying and rent-seeking activities, litigation, advertising
and political campaigns, tournaments as incentive devices in labor markets, competition for
college admissions, sports competitions, urban architecture, and territorial contests among
organisms.1
1 Applications in these areas include work by Dasgupta (1986), Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003),
Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993), Che and Gale (1998), Baye, Kovenock and
de Vries (2005), Sahuguet and Persico (2006), Konrad (2004), Fu (2006), Groh, Moldovanu, Sela and Sunde
2The principal motivation of this article is that spillovers are often important in rank-order
contests; in many economic environments, one player’s decision aﬀects the other player’s
payoﬀ,a n dt h en a t u r eo ft h i se ﬀect may depend on the rank-order of the players’ choices.
This is perhaps most obvious in second-price auctions where the high bidder pays the second
highest bid, but spillovers also arise in a variety of economic contexts. For instance, an
extensive literature starting with D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) has examined the
eﬀects of positive spillovers in R&D competition that can arise when one player’s R&D
eﬀort provides information that beneﬁts its rival. Although D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) does not involve rank-order eﬀects, a growing literature, starting from an original
observation by Dasgupta (1986), models the R&D process as a rank-order tournament (see
also Che and Gale (2003) and Zhou (2006)). The results examined in this article apply to
the positive spillovers arising in this context.
Rank-order spillovers also arise in models of litigation. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
(2005), for instance, examine equilibrium in a litigation game with incomplete information
in which legal expenditures increase the quality of the case presented and where the “best
case” wins. This turns the litigation process into a rank order contest in which the litigation
incentives in legal systems, such as the American, British, Continental and “Quayle” systems,
may be examined. Although the American system, where litigants pay their own legal costs,
involves no spillovers, other fee-shifting rules, such as the British and Continental rules,
which require that losers compensate winners for a portion of their legal costs, and the
Quayle system, in which the loser reimburses the winner up to the amount actually spent
by the loser, involve spillovers. Under the British and Continental rules there is an indirect
spillover eﬀect of the winner’s expenditure on the loser that is negative. In the continuation
we call this a second-order negative spillover eﬀect. In the case of the Quayle system, there
is an indirect spillover of the loser’s expenditure on the winner that is positive. We call this
a ﬁrst-order positive spillover eﬀect.
Our taxonomy of spillover eﬀects may also be used to construct and analyze variants
and extensions of the auction and contest literatures noted above. For instance, the classic
partnership dissolution problem may be viewed as the auction of a business in which two
partners simultaneously submit bids and the partner with the higher bid pays his bid to the
partner with the lower bid in return for ownership of the business. In this case, the payment
(forthcoming), Helsley and Strange (2008), and Kura (1999).
3of the winning partner is a second-order positive spillover eﬀect on the loser. Similarly, both
the ﬁrst-price and second-price all-pay auctions, often used to model economic and biological
contests, may be extended to include environments in which eﬀort expended imposes both
a rank-order contingent direct eﬀect on the player expending the eﬀort and a rank order
spillover eﬀect on the player’s rival. For instance, if two organisms are engaged in a territorial
ﬁght, the eﬀort of the winner may exact both a cost to the winner (a ﬁrst-order negative
direct eﬀect) and a cost to the loser (a second-order negative spillover eﬀect). The loser’s
eﬀort may have a second-order negative direct eﬀect on the loser’s payoﬀ and a ﬁrst-order
negative spillover eﬀect on the winner.
An important class of economic environments where rank-order dependent spillovers arise
naturally is the analysis of auctions adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models
of individual choice. In Section 3 we show that our characterization may be used to examine
behavioral models that include: (i) tournaments in which individuals exhibit inequality
aversion in the spirit of Fehr-Schmidt (1999), (ii) ﬁrst-price and all-pay auctions where players
experience regret similar to that in the models of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2007), and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), and (iii) an all-pay auction
in which players maximize relative ﬁt n e s sa c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁnite agent Evolutionary Stable
Strategies (ESS) equilibrium of Schaﬀer (1988)2.
Section 3 also shows that many pricing games have rank-order dependent spillovers that
may be analyzed within our framework. For instance, a variant of the classic Bertrand
model, due to Varian (1980), has two sellers simultaneously setting a price and selling to
three inelastic segments of demand with common choke price, r. One of these inelastic
segments consists of price sensitive consumers who are aware of both prices in the market
and who purchase from the lower-price seller, while the other two segments are attached to
diﬀerent ﬁrms and are each aware of only the price of that ﬁrm to which they are attached
(as long as that price is at or below the choke price). Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992)
have shown that this game has a structure similar to that of a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction in
which the bid is the diﬀerence between the choke price and a ﬁrm’s price. In this context, the
bid corresponds to the opportunity cost of the lost revenue from the seller’s own uninformed
segment that results from reducing price in order to attempt to capture the “prize” consisting
2See also Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004) who, to the best of our knowledge, were the
ﬁrst to apply the ESS equilibrium concept in a (Tullock) contest.
4of the demand of the informed price-sensitive consumer segment.
Spillovers also arise naturally in the context of the Varian model when one examines pop-
ular price matching policies (see Lin (1988), Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Baye and Kovenock
(1994)). If a high price seller institutes a price matching policy it will sell at its own price
to consumers informed only of that price, but sell at its rival’s price to a proportion of the
informed customers who are willing to bear the cost of visiting the high price seller and
taking it up on its oﬀer to match the better price. In this case the rival’s low price generates
a spillover eﬀect on the high price seller’s payoﬀ, but not vice-versa. Section 3 also includes
additional applications of our results, including a “reference pricing” version of the Varian
model that includes “relative bargain” seekers whose demand from the low-price ﬁrm de-
pends on the ratio of the high price to the low price. With reference pricing, a rival’s high
price generates a spillover eﬀect on low price seller’s payoﬀ, but not vice-versa.
All of these models have the property that they are special cases of the linear parameter-
ized class of rank-order contests whose symmetric equilibria we characterize in this paper.
In Section 2 we formally introduce this class of models and provide a general closed-form
solution for the symmetric equilibria of the class. We characterize the symmetric equilib-
rium strategies as functions of “contest parameters,” which when varied change the “rules”
of the contest. In Section 3, we show how this characterization may be used to directly ob-
tain closed-form solutions for symmetric equilibrium strategies in these and other economic
environments. In Section 4 we conclude. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model and Results
We study the symmetric Nash equilibria of the class of two-player games of complete infor-
m a t i o ni nw h i c he a c hp l a y e ri ∈ {1,2} chooses an action (or bid) xi from the strategy space





W (xi,x j) ≡ v − βxi − δxj if xi >x j
L(xi,x j) ≡− γ − αxi − θxj if xi <x j
T (xi,x j) ≡ 1
2W (xi,x j)+1
2L(xi,x j) if xi = xj
(1)
5We assume that V ≡ v + γ>0 and v ≥ 0; otherwise, one could simply redeﬁne winning as
losing and vice versa.3 We also assume that at least one of the contest parameters β, δ, α,
or θ is nonzero.4 In the sequel, we let Γ denote an arbitrary game within this class.
The δ and θ parameters capture the externalities (negative or positive) that contestants
may inﬂict on each other. We use the terms “ﬁrst-order positive (negative) spillover eﬀects”
when δ<(>)0, and “second-order positive (negative) spillover eﬀects” when θ<(>)0.
This captures the fact that when xi is the higher bid (the ﬁrst in rank-order), the spillover
eﬀect of player j’s bid, j 6= i, on player i’s payoﬀ is linear with coeﬃcient −δ.I f δ>0,
this eﬀect is negative and if δ<0 this eﬀect is positive. Likewise, when player i’s bid is
the lower bid (second in the rank-order), the spillover eﬀect of player j’s bid, j 6= i,i sl i n e a r
with coeﬃcient −θ.I fθ>0, this eﬀect is negative and if θ<0 this eﬀect is positive. For
similar reasons, we refer to β and α as the ﬁrst- and second-order direct eﬀects. If player i’s
bid xi is the higher bid, or ﬁrst, in the rank-order, the direct eﬀect of player i’ sb i do np l a y e r
i0s payoﬀ is linear with coeﬃcient −β. If β>0, the ﬁrst order direct eﬀect of an increase
in player i’s bid is negative and is positive if β<0. Similar interpretations apply to the
second-order direct eﬀect, α.
Notice that, were the strategy space bounded and one is merely interested in establishing
existence of a symmetric equilibrium, one could readily analyze this class of games using
the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) framework. For games of incomplete information, Lizzeri
and Perisco (2000) examine existence and uniqueness of bidding strategies in auctions where
W (xi,x j) and L(xi,x j) need not be linear, while Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2005)
provide closed-form expressions for equilibrium strategies in the linear case. In what follows,
we provide closed-form solutions for symmetric pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria for the
case of complete information, and allow for parameter conﬁgurations not accounted for in
the Lizzeri-Persico and Baye-Kovenock-deVries analysis.5
3In particular, note that V> 0 implies W (0,0) >L(0,0). Analysis of the case where V ≡ v + γ =0is
available upon request from the authors.
4T h ec a s ew h e r eβ = δ = α = θ =0corresponds to the game of “pick the greatest non-negative real
number,” which does not have an equilibrium when the strategy space is unbounded.
5Complete information analogues of the Lizzeri-Persico axioms (labelled A1-A8) would require α ≥ 0 (A5,
A7), β>0 (A7), δ ≥ 0 (A7), and θ =0(A7). Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries assume, in their incomplete
information framework, that (β,α) > 0,δ=( 1− α),a n dθ =( 1− β).
62.1 Symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
We ﬁrst provide the conditions under which there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium, x∗, such that each player earns the equilibrium payoﬀ U∗ < ∞.T o t h i s e n d ,d e ﬁne
η ≡ α + θ − β − δ, so that η measures the change in the payoﬀ per unit of expenditure at
x∗derived solely from changes in the direct and spillover eﬀects (and not from winning V )
that result from the switch from being a loser to being a winner at x∗.
Proposition 1 Γ has a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if the following
three conditions jointly hold: (i) β ≥ 0,( i i )α ≤ 0 and (iii) η<0. Furthermore, there is but







β + δ − α − θ
. (2)
Examples of applications of Proposition 1 to games of complete information include the
ﬁrst price auction ( γ =0 , β =1 , δ = α = θ =0 )w h e r ex∗ = v and the second-price auction
( γ =0 , δ =1 , β = α = θ =0 )w h e r ex∗ = v. Proposition 1 also implies that games such as
the standard ﬁrst-price all-pay auction (β = α =1 , δ = θ =0 ) and the second-price all-pay
auction (also called the war of attrition, where δ = α =1 , β = θ =0 )d on o th a v es y m m e t r i c
pure-strategy equilibria. Since it is known that these special cases of Γ do have symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria, we provide a characterization of all such equilibria to Γ.
2.2 Symmetric mixed-strategy Equilibria
Let F(x) be the cumulative distribution function describing a symmetric equilibrium mixed
strategy of Γ, if one exists, and let EU∗ ∈ (−∞,∞) denote the associated equilibrium
(expected) payoﬀ.6 If F has a density f(x) on (m,u), then the expected payoﬀ to a player








Since F is a symmetric equilibrium by hypothesis, EU(w)=EU∗ on w ∈ (m,u). Hence,
dEU(w)
dw
=[ V + ηw]f(w) − α +( α − β)F(w)=0 (3)
6Note that the strategy space and payoﬀsi ne q u a t i o n(1) are unbounded. Consequently, if a player’s
expected payoﬀ against a rival’s mixed-strategy does not exist (that is, the relevant integral diverges to
±∞), that strategy cannot comprise a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.



















where m ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ C ≤ 1.
Notice that this derivation of the functional form for a symmetric equilibrium mixed-
strategy is only heuristic, as it ignores mass points, the possibility of proﬁtable deviations
outside of (m,u), and furthermore, may not represent a well-deﬁned distribution function
for some parameter conﬁgurations. Our next proposition addresses these issues formally and
characterizes the non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria to Γ.
Proposition 2 Γ has a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium if and only if
one of the following three sets of conditions holds: (i) β>0 and α>0; (ii) β =0 , α>0
and either ηθ =0or η<α ; or (iii) β =0 ,α<0 and either α<η<0 or η<θ=0 .
In cases (i) and (ii), the equilibrium is unique within the class of symmetric equilibria (pure
or mixed). In case (iii) there exists a continuum of nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibria, as well as a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (given in Proposition 1).
The nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria are atomless and described by the
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if η =0 ;α − β 6=0
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if α>0;β>0;α 6= β;η 6=0
V
η [exp(η/α) − 1] if α = β>0;η 6=0
V
α−β ln α
β if α>0;β>0;α 6= β;η =0
V/α if α>0;β>0;α = β;η =0
∞ if otherwise
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β if η 6=0 ;α 6= β;θ = δ;β 6=0
θv+δγ
θ−δ + αδ
θ−δm∗ if η 6=0 ;α 6= β;θ 6=0 ;β =0
−γ − αm∗ if η 6=0 ;α 6= β;θ =0 ;β =0
θv+δγ








V if η 6=0 ;α − β =0
θv+δγ








V if η =0 ;α − β 6=0 ;β 6=0
θv+δγ
θ−δ if η =0 ;α − β 6=0 ;β =0
−γ − θ
2αV if η =0 ;α − β =0
(7)
Notice that all of the terms in equations (5), 6 and (7) are well-deﬁned, since conditions
(i) through (iii) which guarantee the existence of a non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium imply: (a) α 6=0 , (b) if α<0, then η<0 and β =0 ;(c) if α = β, then α>0
and β>0;( d )i fα = β and η 6=0 , then θ 6= δ; (e) if α 6= β and η =0 , then θ 6= δ;a n d( f )i f
β 6=0then α>0 and β>0.
The Appendix constructively derives all of the possible symmetric equilibria and the
resulting payoﬀs in a series of lemmata, and also indicates when an equilibrium does not
exist. The analysis in the Appendix implies that one may also obtain closed-form expressions
for the equilibrium strategies by taking limits of equation (4). For instance, the functional
form for the equilibrium distribution function in Proposition 2 when η 6=0and α = β obtains
by taking the limit of equation (4) as α − β tends to zero.
Propositions 1 and 2, which characterize the parameter ranges where symmetric pure
and nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibria arise, together facilitate a complete partition
of the parameter space into ranges of qualitatively diﬀerent symmetric Nash equilibrium
correspondences. We summarize this in
Proposition 3 The symmetric equilibria to Γ are characterized as follows:
(a) The unique symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies if and only if one of the
following three conditions holds: (i) β>0,α≤ 0, and η<0; (ii) β =0 ,α=0 , and η<0;
or (iii) β =0 ,η≤ α<0, and θ 6=0 .
(b) The unique symmetric equilibrium is in nondegenerate mixed strategies if and only
one of the following two conditions holds: (i) β>0 and α>0;o r(ii) β =0 , α>0 and
either ηθ =0or η<α .
9(c) There is a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium and a continuum of nondegen-
erate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria if and only if β =0 ,α<0 and either α<η<0
or η<θ=0 .
Furthermore, if none of the conditions in (a) through (c) hold, Γ does not have a sym-
metric equilibrium (either pure or mixed).
It is important to emphasize that we have focused solely on symmetric equilibria. Asym-
metric equilibria are known to exist, for instance, in the symmetric two player war of attrition
(α = δ =1 ,β = θ =0 )and sad loser auction (α =1 ,β = θ = δ =0 ) . We also note that,
were there a common ﬁnite upper bound on the strategy space for the players (such that the
strategy space is compact), existence of a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed by Lemma 7
of Dasgupta-Maskin (1986).
Before proceeding, we oﬀer several observations about the four functional forms for the
symmetric equilibrium mixed-strategies that can arise under diﬀerent parameter conﬁgura-
tions. First, note that the lower bound of the support, m∗, of every symmetric equilibrium
mixed-strategy to Γ is zero when α>0, but an arbitrary positive number m∗ ∈ (−V/η,∞)
when α<0 (this accounts for the continuum of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria that
arise in this case). Second, notice that the equilibrium mixed-strategies take on diﬀerent
functional forms (including the uniform distribution, exponential distribution, as well as
more exotic forms) depending on which of four regions (denoted R1-R4) the parameters lie:
R1: η =0and α = β. In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply that
only condition (i) can be satisﬁed, and therefore α = β>0 and θ = δ. The standard
all-pay auction (α = β =1and θ = δ =0 )i sas p e c i a lc a s eo ft h i sc o n ﬁguration. More
generally, this conﬁguration is a modiﬁed ﬁrst-price all-pay auction in which θ = δ 6=0
is a “nuisance parameter” that does not inﬂuence the symmetric equilibrium mixed-
strategy (which is a uniform distribution) but does, impact the players’ equilibrium
expected payoﬀs.
R2: η 6=0and α = β. In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply that
only condition (i) is satisﬁed, and therefore α = β>0 and θ 6= δ. In this case the
asymmetric spillovers impact both the equilibrium payoﬀsa n dt h es y m m e t r i cm i x e d
strategies (which take on a logarithmic form). To the best of our knowledge, contests
or auctions with parameters in R2 have not here-to-for been examined in the literature.
10Notice that a game with parameters in R1 is the limit of games with parameters in
R2 as the spillovers become symmetric. Hence, games with parameters in R2 may be
interpreted as a generalized ﬁrst-price all-pay auction with asymmetric spillovers.
R3: η =0and α 6= β. In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply
that either (i) or (ii) applies, and therefore α>0, β ≥ 0 and θ 6= δ.I nt h i sc a s et h e
asymmetric spillovers impact the symmetric equilibrium payoﬀs but not the equilibrium
mixed-strategies (which take the form of a truncated exponential distribution). The
standard war of attrition (α = δ =1 , β = θ =0 ) is a special case of a Γ with
parameters in R3. Notice that when β>0, the symmetric mixed-strategy has a
bounded upper support, whereas it is unbounded when β =0(and hence the symmetric
mixed-strategies are a non-truncated exponential distribution).
R4: η 6=0and α 6= β. In this case, any of the conditions (i), (ii),o r(iii) may apply.
This is, in a sense, the most general form of an all pay auction in which direct eﬀects
are asymmetric and spillovers may be either symmetric or asymmetric. When both
α and β are positive, Proposition 2 implies that the support of the distribution is
bounded. When β =0 , the support of the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategies is
unbounded unless η<0; the unbounded distribution is known as a Burr distribution
with a Pareto type upper tail such that not all moments exist. Notice that part (ii)
of Proposition 2 includes the case where β =0 , α>0,a n dθ =0 . The Riley and
Samuelson (1980) sad loser auction in which only the loser pays his bid (β = δ = θ =0
and α =1 )is a special case of this conﬁguration. The case where β =0 ,α>0 and
α>η6=0may be viewed as a sad loser auction with spillovers (δ>θ). Finally, note
that when α<β=0and either α<η<0 or η<θ=0 , there is a continuum of
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria which stem from the continuum of lower bounds
for the support that arise when α<0. The Baye-Morgan (1999) folk-theorem for
one-shot, homogeneous product Bertrand games, which entails both a continuum of
symmetric equilibrium strategies and equilibrium payoﬀs, is an example of an economic
environment that may be viewed as a Γ with parameters in R4.7
7More technically, Example 1 in Baye-Morgan (1999) corresponds to a limit of this case.
113 Applications
We now are in a position to show how our characterization of symmetric equilibria may be
used to obtain closed-form expressions for equilibrium strategies in economic environments
that include auctions, contests, and pricing games. In so doing, we also show that our
results may be used to generalize existing models to allow for spillover eﬀects, and to exam-
ine the implications of alternative behavioral and evolutionary assumptions on equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we suppress ties, which we assume are broken with the ﬂip of a fair
coin.
3.1 Auctions and Contests with Spillovers
In addition to standard auctions and contests (such as ﬁrst- and second-price auctions,
the war of attrition, and the all-pay auction), our framework may be used to characterize
symmetric equilibria in more exotic economic applications.
Partnership Dissolution (The Self-Auction). Two partners wish to dissolve a part-
nership each values at v. They simultaneously submit bids; the high bidder wins the asset





v − xi if xi >x j
xj if xι <x j
a n dt h u st h eg a m em a yb ev i e w e da saΓ with V = v, β = −θ =1 ,α= δ =0 , and η = −2.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the only symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium is x∗ = v/2.
Furthermore, Proposition 3 reveals that the self-auction does not have a non-degenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
An Innovation Contest with Spillovers. O n em a ya l s ou s eo u rr e s u l t st oe x t e n dD a s -
gupta’s (1986) all-pay auction formulation of an R&D race by allowing each ﬁrm’s expen-
diture on R&D to induce an informational spillover that beneﬁts the rival. In particular,
suppose the winner receives a greater beneﬁt per unit of expenditure from the loser’s ex-






v − xi − δxj if xi >x j
−xi − θxj if xι <x j
.
This game may be viewed as a Γ in which V = v>0, α = β =1 ,a n dδ<θ<0. Since
α − β =0and η>0, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the unique symmetric equilibrium is


























Territorial Contests with Injuries. Next, consider a generalization of an all-pay auction
formulation of a territorial contest in which the outcome of the battle depends on the intensity
of eﬀort put forth by the two players in the ﬁght, where each player values the territory in
dispute at v. Suppose the cost to a player per unit of intensity of eﬀort is unity (α = β =1 ),
and each unit of eﬀort a player expends in the battle imposes a cost on its rival (through
injury), so that δ, θ>0. If the cost to the loser per unit of intensity of eﬀort of the winner
is greater than the cost to the winner per unit of intensity of eﬀort of the loser (θ>δ>0),
then α − β =0and η = θ − δ>0. In this case, Proposition 2 reveals that the symmetric
equilibrium of this game is identical to that in the above innovation contest with spillovers.
If, on the other hand, the eﬀorts of the winner and loser entail symmetric injury (θ =
δ>0), Proposition 2 implies that the symmetric equilibrium mixed-strategy is given by
F
∗ (x)=x/v on [0,v],
which corresponds to the all-pay auction. However, expected payoﬀsa r enot zero as they are
in the standard all-pay auction. Notice that, as a result of spillovers, both of these variants
diﬀer from the classic war of attrition (β = θ =0and α = δ =1 ) ,w h i c hl i e si nt h er e g i o n
of R3 that entails an equilibrium distribution that is an exponential distribution.
Litigation Contests with Fee Shifting. Our framework may also be used to characterize
symmetric equilibria for the complete information analogues of the Baye et al. (2005) model
of litigation contests under incomplete information. In this application, players are litigants
who compete by choosing (quality normalized) expenditures on legal services, with the player
spending the higher amount winning the case valued at v. The fee shifting rules examined
by Baye et al. may be examined under complete information using the tools developed in
Section 2.
13For instance, under the Continental rule, the loser pays his own legal expenditure and, ad-
ditionally, reimburses the winner a fraction (1−β) ∈ (0,1) of the winner’s legal expenditures.
Thus, the Continental Rule is a Γ with V = v, 0 <β<α=1 , and δ =0<θ=( 1− β).
























and the equilibrium payoﬀ is EU∗ = −v(1 − β)/(2β) < 0.
In contrast, under the Quayle rule where the loser reimburses the winner up to the amount
actually spent by the loser, V = v, α =2 , β =1 , δ = −1 and θ =0 .S i n c eα>0,β>0,


















and the equilibrium payoﬀ is EU∗ =0 . Furthermore, Proposition 1 reveals that symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria do not arise in these litigation environments.
3.2 Price Competition
We mentioned earlier that our framework readily includes standard models of price com-
petition under complete information that take the form of ﬁrst-and second-price auctions
(which have a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies) as well variants such as
Baye-Morgan (1999) (which have a continuum of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria). We
next show that several leading models of price competition in the industrial organization
literature are also subsumed in our framework.
The Varian/Rosenthal Model. The price setting models of Varian (1980) and Rosenthal
(1980) may be analyzed in our framework as follows. Here, two price-setting ﬁrms each
service a ﬁxed number, L>0, of loyal (or uninformed) consumers who have unit demand up
to a choke price , r>0. Additionally, there are S>0 price sensitive “shoppers” (or informed
consumers) who always purchase from the ﬁrm charging the lowest price–provided it does





(S + L)pi if pi <p j
Lpi if pi >p j
14To see that this model is a special case of our framework, deﬁne xi ≡ r − pi ≥ 0 so that





(S + L)r − (S + L)xi if xi >x j
rL− Lxi if xi <x j
Thus, the Varian/Rosenthal models may be interpreted as a Γ with v =( S + L)r, γ = −rL,
V = rS > 0, β =( S + L) > 0, δ = θ =0 , α = L>0, and η = −S<0. Hence, by
Proposition 2, the equilibrium (expressed in terms of the discount from the monopoly price,

















To write this expression in terms of the equilibrium distribution of prices, G∗ (p),u s et h e


















Price Matching Guarantees. One may also use our results to extend the Varian/Rosenthal
models to allow for price matching policies, as in Png and Hirshleifer (1987) and Baye and
Kovenock (1994). To see this, extend the Varian/Rosenthal models by assuming that the
two ﬁrms not only list prices, but also promise to match a better price by the rival. Here,
one interprets S as informed consumers who are aware of the ﬁrms’ prices, L as uninformed
consumers who are unaware of the ﬁrms’ prices, and one assumes that only a proportion
μ<1/2 of the informed customers are willing to bear the cost of visiting a ﬁrm charging






(L +( 1− μ)S)pi if pi <p j
Lpi + μSpj if pi >p j





r((1 − μ)S + L) − ((1 − μ)S + L)xi if xi >x j
r(L + μS) − Lxi − μSxj if xi <x j
Note that V =( 1 − 2μ)Sr > 0,β=( 1 − μ)S + L>0,α= L>0,θ= Sμ > 0, and

























As before, one may easily re-write this distribution of discounts from the monopoly price
purely in terms of the prices.
3.3 Behavioral and Evolutionary Extensions
The results in Section 2 may also be used to extend existing models to account for behavioral
or evolutionary considerations that impact the payoﬀs in standard games. We discuss these
applications next.
Reference Pricing. One may use our results to analyze an extension of the Varian/Rosenthal
models to account for reference pricing. To see this, suppose that in addition to shoppers
and loyal consumers, there also exists a measure of “relative bargain seekers.” As above,
all consumer segments have a common choke price, r>0. Relative bargain seekers, like
shoppers, always purchase from the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest price. But unlike shoppers, the
demand of relative bargain seekers depends on how low the best price is in comparison to the
next best price: The lower the “best” price relative to that of the higher price, the greater
their demand for the low priced good. To capture this behavior, assume that when ﬁrm i
charges the lowest price, its demand from relative bargain seekers is Di ≡ λpj/pi while ﬁrm
j’s demand from these consumers is zero. When λ>0, this captures the behavioral phe-
nomenon where the demand by one segment of consumers depends, in part, on their frame
of reference.










pi if pi <p j
Lpi if pi >p j
.





r(S + L + λ) − xi (S + L) − λxj if xi >x j
rL− Lxi if xi <x j
.
16Thus, this extension is a Γ with V = r(S + λ) > 0,α= L>0,β= S+L>0,θ=0 ,δ= λ,














































This distribution converges to that in the Varian/Rosenthal model as λ tends to zero.
Interestingly, when there are only loyal customers and relative bargain seekers (S =0 ),





















Inequality Aversion in a Job Tournament. Next, consider an environment where two
workers compete in a job tournament but, in the spirit of Fehr-Schmidt (1999), exhibit a
specialized form of inequality aversion such that they receive disutility from inequality of
eﬀort. In particular, suppose that the worker exerting the greater eﬀort (xi) receives a bonus





μ − xi − b(xi − xj) if xi >x j
−xi − a(xj − xi) if xi <x j
where 0 <a<1 and 0 <b . This captures behavior where the winner experiences disutility
for having “slaughtered” the loser, and the loser derived disutility from having been beaten





μ − (1 + b)xi + bxj if xi >x j
−(1 − a)xi − axj if xi <x j
.
This behavioral environment may thus be viewed as a Γ in which V = v = μ>0,γ=0 ,
α =1− a>0,θ= a, β =1+b>0 and δ = −b<0. Note that α− β = −(a + b) < 0 and
η =0 .
Since α =1− a>0, it is immediate from Proposition 1 that there does not exist a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. However, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a unique








































It is interesting to note that if a ∈ (0,1) but b ∈ (−1,0) (so that the winner enjoys
“slaughtering” the loser), the equilibrium strategies and payoﬀsh a v ee x a c t l yt h es a m ef o r m
when b 6= −a.B u tw h e nb = −a (so that α−β =0and η =0 ), the equilibrium distribution

















Loss Aversion in a Job Tournament. Two workers compete in a job tournament and






μ − xi if xi >x j
−xi if xι <x j
Suppose the workers’ utility (over income) exhibits “loss aversion” in that ui = yi if player i






μ − xi if xi >x j
−λxi if xι <x j
and this scenario may be analyzed as a Γ with v = μ, γ =0 ,V = μ>0,α= λ>0,
β =1> 0,θ= δ =0 , and η = α − β = λ − 1 > 0. Hence, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that




μ +( λ − 1)x
on [0,μ].
18Regret in Auctions. A growing literature has examined regret in auctions; see Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1989), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007), and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007)
and the references cited therein. To illustrate how our framework may be used to examine
the implications of this behavioral assumption in complete information environments, con-
sider a ﬁrst-price auction where each player i ∈ {1,2} values the item at v, but there is





v − xi − μ(xi − xj) if xi >x j
0 if xi <x j
.
Here, xi is player i’s bid and v>0 is the value of the item; winner regret (μ>0)r e f e r st ot h e
fact that the high bidder derives disutility from leaving money on the table (the diﬀerence





v − (μ +1 )xi + μxj if xi >x j
0 if xi <x j
which is a rank-order contest, Γ,w i t hapositive ﬁrst-order spillover eﬀects. In particular,
V = v, α = θ =0 ,β=( 1+μ) > 0,δ= −μ, and η = −1, so Proposition 1 implies that a
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is given by x∗ = v.F u r t h e r m o r e ,b y
Proposition 3, there are no symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria.





v − xi if xi >x j
−ρ(v − xj) if xi <x j
where ρ>0. Preferences with loser regret thus transform the standard auction into a rank-
order contest with a positive second-order spillover eﬀect, and one can use the results in
Section 2 to conclude that the unique symmetric equilibrium (pure or mixed) is x∗ = v.
The results of Section 2 may also be used to extend these behavioral models to include
combined winner and loser regret in a ﬁrst-price auction. In this case, both ﬁrst and second





v − (μ +1 )xi + μxj if xi >x j
−ρ(v − xj) if xi <x j
.
19One can readily establish that the unique symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies and
given by x∗ = v.
Furthermore, our results may be utilized to examine the implications of combined winner-
loser regret in other auction environments. For instance, in an all-pay auction with winner-





v − (μ +1 )xi + μxj if xi >x j
−vρ− (ρ +1 )xi + ρxj if xi <x j
This may be viewed as a Γ in which V =( 1 + ρ)v, α =( 1 + ρ) > 0,β=( 1 + μ) > 0,


























and each player earns an expected payoﬀ of
EU
∗ = vρ+ ρ(1 + ρ)v
(1 + μ)ln
1+μ
1+ρ + ρ − μ
(ρ − μ)
2 .
However, if ρ = μ,s ot h a tα = β, one obtains the standard all-pay auction form: F∗ (x)=
x/v. In this case, total expected eﬀort is the same with symmetric winner loser regret as in
the standard all-pay auction, but EU∗ = −ρv/2.
ESS in the All-Pay Auction. Finally, one may utilize our results to construct equilibrium
strategies in certain evolutionary environments. To see this, consider a two player all-pay
auction and note that the (ﬁnite agent) ESS equilibrium of Schaﬀer (1988) requires that each





v − xi − (−xj) if xi >x j
−xi − (v − xj) if xi <x j





v − xi + xj if xi >x j
−v − xi + xj if xi <x j
.
and V =2 v>0, β = α = −θ = −δ =1 , and consequently, α − β =0and η =0 . One
may therefore apply the results in Section 2 to conclude that the unique symmetric Nash
20equilibrium to a game with these payoﬀs (which corresponds to the ESS equilibrium of a






Among other things, this implies that there is overdissipation of rents in the ESS equilibrium.
This is similar to the ﬁndings of Hehenkamp et al. (2004) for the case of a Tullock contest.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has characterized symmetric equilibria (pure and mixed) in a parameterized class
of two player complete information contests with rank-order spillovers. We derived explicit
closed form solutions for the complete set of symmetric equilibrium strategies for this class
of games, and showed that these strategies take on only a small number of functional forms
that depend on the parameters in a systematic and easily veriﬁed way. We concluded by
using this framework to formulate and solve several new contests. Not only are a plethora
of existing models of auctions, contests, and price competition covered as special cases, but
our results permit one to extend these models to allow for a broader array of preferences,
spillover eﬀects, and equilibrium concepts. The logarithmic equilibrium distribution that
arises in the all-pay auction with asymmetric spillovers, for example, appears to be novel
to the literature. We believe that Propositions 1 through 3 will provide positive spillovers
for future applied work on auctions, contests, and pricing strategies, as well as behavioral
economics and evolutionary game theory.
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24Appendix
This Appendix provides the proofs of Propositions 1 through 3. Recall the deﬁnitions of
W, L,a n dT are given in equation (1).
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
The following lemma is useful in proving Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 x ∈ [0,∞) is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
T (x,x) ≥ W (y,x) for all y ≥ x (8)
T (x,x) ≥ L(y,x) for all 0 ≤ y ≤ x








t h ec o n d i t i o n si n(8) imply
T (x,x)=W (x,x)=L(x,x).
( ⇐=)By hypothesis, x ∈ [0,∞) satisﬁes
T (x,x) ≥ W (y,x) for all y ≥ x
T (x,x) ≥ L(y,x) for all y ≤ x
Hence, if player i plays the pure strategy xi = x when player j plays xj = x, she earns a
payoﬀ of U∗ = T (x,x)=W (x,x)=L(x,x). The conditions in (8) imply that player i
cannot gain by deviating from x, given that xj = x.
(= ⇒ ) If (x,x) is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, player i earns a payoﬀ of
T (x,x) in this equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists a y ∈ [0,∞) such
that y>xwith T (x,x) <W(y,x).T h e np l a y e ri could increase his payoﬀ to W (y,x) >
T (x,x) by deviating from xi = x to xi = y, a contradiction. Similarly, if there existed a
y ∈ [0,∞) such that y<xwith T (x,x) <L (y,x),p l a y e ri could increase his payoﬀ to
L(y,x) >T(x,x) by deviating from xi = x to xi = y, a contradiction.
We conclude that the conditions in (8) are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of
a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that the proof of Lemma 1 does not
25rely on the linear structure for W and L in equation (1), and hence applies to more general
formulations for payoﬀs.
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 1. We do so by exploiting the linear
structure in equation (1) and applying Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. (=⇒) By way of contradiction, suppose x ∈ [0,∞) is a
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium so that player i earns his equilibrium payoﬀ
of U∗ = T (x,x)=W (x,x)=L(x,x) at (x,x).I f c o n d i t i o n (i) in Proposition 1 did
not hold, then player i could deviate to earn W (x + ε,x) >U ∗ = W (x,x),s i n c eβ<
0 implies W (xi,x) is increasing in xi, a contradiction. If condition (iii) did not hold,
then V + ηx = W (x,x) − L(x,x) > 0, which contradicts the conditions in (8). Finally,
since V> 0, condition (iii) implies x>0. Thus, if condition (ii) did not hold, then
x>0 and α>0, in which case player i could deviate to earn a payoﬀ of L(x − ε,x) >
L(x,x)=W (x,x)=U∗, since α>0 implies L(xi,x) is decreasing in xi, a contradiction.
(⇐=) Suppose conditions (i) through (iii) hold. It is immediate that condition (iii) im-
plies that x∗ = −V/η is well-deﬁned and V + ηx∗ = W (x∗,x ∗) − L(x∗,x ∗)=0 . Hence,
W (x∗,x ∗)=L(x∗,x ∗)=T (x∗,x ∗). Next, note that there is no incentive to deviate from x∗,
since (i) implies T (x∗,x ∗) ≥ W (y,x∗) for all y ≥ x∗,a n d(ii) implies T (x∗,x ∗) ≥ L(y,x∗)
for all y ≤ x∗. B yt h eL e m m a1 ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tx∗ is a symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that x∗ = −V/η is the unique
solution to W (x,x) − L(x,x)=0 .
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
Our second proposition is proved through a sequence of lemmas. We ﬁrst demonstrate
that if an atom exists at some point (x,x) in a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium of Γ, then (x,x) constitutes a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium as well. We
then apply Proposition 1 to show that this can occur only over a restricted range of the pa-
rameter space and that any such atom is unique. Consequently, if the symmetric equilibrium
is in nondegenerate mixed strategies, there must exist an absolutely continuous part of the
mixed-strategy, and furthermore, it must satisfy the diﬀerential equation in equation (3).
Given the linearity of diﬀerential equation (3), it readily follows that its solution over the
interval (m,u) is unique (as it satisﬁes a Lipschitz condition). Lemma 4 provides an end-
point restriction on the lower bound of the distribution. We then examine (by exhaustion) a
partition of the parameter space to show (i) when the diﬀerential equation can be solved in
26a manner consistent with the corresponding restrictions on mass points and endpoints, (ii)
which solutions indeed deﬁne equilibria in the sense that there is no incentive for a player to
unilaterally deviate from his strategy, and (iii) whether the diﬀerential equation, mass point
and endpoint restrictions are inconsistent, thereby implying nonexistence of a nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy. We also derive the corresponding equilibrium payoﬀs.
Lemma 2 If there is an atom at some point x ∈ [0,∞) in a nondegenerate symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium of Γ,t h e n(x,x) is also a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of
Γ. Furthermore, there is no atom at x =0 .
Proof. If there is an atom of size qx ∈ (0,1) at some point x,i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that qx [W (x + ε,x) − T (x,x)] ≤ 0 (there is no incentive to raise the bid above x)a n d ,
if in addition x>0,q x [L(x − ε,x) − T (x,x)] ≤ 0 for small ε>0 (there is no incen-
tive to lower the bid below x). Furthermore, there can be no atom at x =0 , since
q0 [W (0 + ε,0) − T (0,0)] ≤ 0 implies W (0,0) − T (0,0) ≤ 0 from the linearity of W,
contradicting W (0,0) − T (0,0) = V> 0.F o r x>0, since qx > 0 by hypothesis,
[W (x + ε,x) − T (x,x)] ≤ 0 and [L(x − ε,x) − T (x,x)] ≤ 0. This implies T (x,x)=
W (x,x)=L(x,x), and furthermore, given the linearity of W and L,
T (x,x) ≥ W (y,x) for all y ≥ x
T (x,x) ≥ L(y,x) for all y ≤ x.
These are exactly the conditions (8) for a pure strategy solution from Theorem 1 and hence
(x,x) must also be a pure strategy equilibrium point.
Lemma 3 Suppose a symmetric equilibrium strategy of Γ has an atom of size qx ∈ (0,1]
at x.T h e n β ≥ 0, α ≤ 0 and η<0. Furthermore the atom is unique and located at
x = −V/η >0.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
Importantly, Lemma 3 implies that if a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium exists, any atom (if one exists) associated with the strategy is necessarily unique
(and given by x = −V/η). Consequently, the remaining absolutely continuous part is char-
acterized by diﬀerential equation (3). We will use this fact to establish when nondegenerate
27symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria exist, their functional forms and the corresponding equi-
librium payoﬀs. We also identify parameter conﬁgurations for which the set of nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria is empty. We also use this lemma to establish:
Lemma 4 Suppose α>0. Then in any non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium of Γ, the lower bound of the support is m =0 .
Proof. The proof proceeds by way of contradiction. Suppose the lower bound of the support
of the equilibrium mixed-strategy is m>0,a n dl e tqm be the size of an atom (possibly zero)
at m : Then a player who bids m earns his equilibrium payoﬀ of
U




V − γ +
qm
2
αm − αm −
qm
2
(θ + β + δ)m − (1 − qm)θEF [x|x>m ].
Deviating by bidding zero yields a payoﬀ of
U
∗∗ = −γ − θqmm − θ(1 − qm)EF [x|x>m ].






{−V +( −θ − α + β + δ)m} + αm = αm > 0,
since qm > 0 implies −V = ηm by Lemma 3. Therefore it pays to deviate by bidding zero,
a contradiction.
We are now in a position to consider, case by case, the parameter conﬁgurations identiﬁed
in Proposition 2. We do this through a sequence of lemmas that are collected according to
the four parameter regions (R1 through R4) deﬁning the diﬀerent forms for the equilibrium
m i x e ds t r a t e g i e si ne q u a t i o n(5), and which establish existence, uniqueness, or non existence
of equilibrium for parameter conﬁgurations within each case. We begin with
Case 1: α − β 6=0 ;η 6=0
Lemma 5 Suppose β =0 , α>0 and η 6=0 . Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium
if and only if either θ =0or η<α . Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique and in
nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition 2.
28Proof. Since α>0, Proposition 1 implies any symmetric equilibrium must be in nondegen-
erate mixed-strategies, and by Lemma 3, there are no atoms. By Lemma 4, m =0 . Hence,







This is a well-deﬁned distribution function; when η>0, the upper bound of its support is
u = ∞;w h e nη<0,i ti su = −V/η < ∞.S i n c eβ =0 , a player cannot gain by choosing
an action w>u . Thus, for an equilibrium to exist, it is suﬃcient to show that EU∗ < ∞
and a player’s expected payoﬀ against a rival who uses F is constant for any action in the
support of F.




(v − δx)dF (x)+
Z u
w
(−γ − αw − θx)dF (x)









Evidently, when θ =0 ,E U(0) = −γ,s oEU (w)=−γ for all w ∈ Support(F), and F is
the unique symmetric equilibrium. Thus, suppose θ 6=0 .
Consider ﬁrst the case where η>0. If α/η − 1 ≤ 0 (or equivalently, δ ≤ θ 6=0 ), the
distribution in (9) has a “fat tail” and hence
R u
0 xdF (x) does not exist. Thus, when β =0 ,
α>0,η > 0, and θ 6=0 , we conclude there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium when
α ≤ η. On the other hand, when α/η − 1 > 0 (or equivalently, δ>θ6=0 ) , the relevant
integral does exist and the expected payoﬀ is
EU













Since for all w ∈ [0,∞), EU (w)=EU∗,i nt h i sc a s ei tf o l l o w st h a tF i st h eu n i q u es y m m e t r i c
equilibrium.
Finally, if η<0,t h e nu = −V/η and simple integration reveals
EU (0) = (θv + δγ)/(θ − δ)=EU (w)
for all w ∈ [0,u], and hence F i st h eu n i q u es y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i u m .
29Lemma 6 Suppose β =0 , α<0 and η>0. Then there does not exist a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Since α<0 and η>0,L e m m a3i m p l i e st h a tF contains no atoms. Hence, C =0













for all w>m ,which implies F(w) ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 7 Suppose β =0 , α<0 and either α<η<0 or η<θ=0 . Then there exists a
continuum of non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, all of which are identiﬁed
in Proposition 2. Furthermore, if β =0 , α<0,η ≤ α and θ 6=0 ,t h e r ed o e sn o te x i s ta
nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1, a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists at x∗ = −V/η.
By Lemma 3, in any non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, there is at most
a single mass point, and this atom is located at −V/η. Let q ∈ [0,1) denote the size of any
such mass point. By way of contradiction, suppose that the lower bound of the absolutely
continuous part of F is m>−V/η (that is, F contains a gap). Then the expected payoﬀ to


































































Recall that V = v + γ and that, under the conditions stated, η = α + θ − δ.P r o v i d e d
R ∞













30a contradiction: there can be no atom below the lower bound of the absolutely continuous
part of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
We next show that under the conditions stated, m>−V/η (which implies there are
no mass points) and that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of the form in
Proposition 2. To see this, note that for α<0 and η<0, equation (3) requires that
m>−V/η in order for F(w) to be a well-deﬁned (and non-degenerate) distribution function
on an open interval above m. It follows that, when β =0 ,α<0 and η<0,t h eo n l y







on [m,∞),where m ∈ (−V/η,∞) is arbitrary. The expected payoﬀ when a player chooses




(v − δx)dF (x)+
Z ∞
w
(−γ − αw − θx)dF (x)
If α/η ≤ 1, the distribution has fat tails (
R ∞
m xdF (x) does not exist). In this case, when θ 6=0 ,
EU (w) is undeﬁned and hence a non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium does
not exist. But if θ =0 , the expected payoﬀ to a player that bids w = m is EU (m)=
−γ−αm, and hence for all w ∈ [m,∞),E U(w)=EU (m).S i n c eα<0,E U(w) <E U(m)
for w<m ,and hence it does not pay to deviate by choosing an action below m.
When α/η > 1 (which implies θ>δ) it follows that for all w ∈ [m,∞),

















Again, since α<0,E U(w) <E U(m) for w<m ,it does not pay to deviate by choosing an
action below m.
Lemma 8 Suppose β<0,α6= β, α 6=0 , and η 6=0 . Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Since β<0, Proposition 1 implies there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium, and by Lemma 3, there are no mass points in a nondegenerate symmetric
31mixed-strategy equilibrium. Since F (m)=0 ,C=0in equation (4); hence, if a symmetric













We claim the distribution is unbounded. To see this, suppose to the contrary that u<∞.
Since F has no atoms, a player that bids u is certain to win and earn an equilibrium payoﬀ
of EU (u)=v − βu− δEF [x].B u t ,s i n c eβ<0, a player who deviates by bidding u0 >u
e a r n sa ne x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ of EU (u0)=v − βu0 − δEF [x] >E U(u), a contradiction.






If (α − β)/η < 0,t h e n
lim
w→∞F(w)=±∞.
Hence, regardless of the sign of (α − β)/η, F is not a well-deﬁned distribution function,
a contradiction. Thus there does not exist a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in this
case.
Lemma 9 Suppose β>0, α<0, η 6=0 . Then there does not exist a nondegenerate sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. If η>0, then there are no mass points by Lemma 3. A symmetric equilibrium, if












for w ∈ (m,u).
Since (α − β)/η < 0 and ηw > ηm ≥ 0 for w>m ,the term is square brackets is negative.
This and the fact that α/(α − β) > 0 implies F (w) < 0, which contradicts the assumption
that F is a well-deﬁned distribution function.
If η<0, Lemma 3 implies that an equilibrium mixed-strategy may have a mass point at














for w ∈ (m,u) (13)
32If the distribution is unbounded, limw→∞ F (w)=α/(α − β) < 1, a contradiction. Thus,
suppose u<∞.
Suppose ﬁrst that the equilibrium distribution contains no mass point. Then the diﬀer-
ential equation in equation (3) holds at u, and since F (u)=1 ,w eh a v e
[V + ηu]f(u) − α +( α − β)=0 .
Now, f (u) ≥ 0,α<0,β>0 and η<0 implies u<−V/η.Hence, the derivative of equation
(13) is
F
0 (w)=α(V + ηm)
α−β




since V + ηw > 0 for all w ∈ [m,u], a contradiction.
Finally, suppose there is a mass point. We ﬁrst show the mass point must be located at
or below m. By way of contradiction, suppose there is a mass point at −V/η > m. In this
case, the diﬀerential equation (3) holds at m,a n dF (m)=0 . Hence,
[V + ηm]f(m) − α =0
Since f (m) ≥ 0,α<0, and 0 ≤ m<−V/η, this is a contradiction.

















Since F0 (w) > 0 for some w>m ,
sgn(F







in order for F to be a well-deﬁned distribution. Since the diﬀerential equation holds at














The LHS is strictly negative by assumption, while the RHS is strictly positive by equation
(14) and the fact that m,u > −V/η–a contradiction.
Hence, there does not exist a nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium.
33Lemma 10 Suppose β>0, α>0,α6= β, and η 6=0 . Then there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed-strategies as identiﬁed in Proposition 2.
Proof. Since α>0, L e m m a3i m p l i e st h e r ea r en om a s sp o i n t s ,a n dL e m m a4i m p l i e s













It is straightforward to show that, for all β>0, α>0,α6= β,and η 6=0 , this a well-deﬁned













Suppose ﬁrst that θ 6= δ (or equivalently, η 6= α − β). The expected payoﬀ t oap l a y e r
that bids w =0against a rival that employs F is
EU



















Hence, EU (w)=EU∗ for all w ∈ [0,u ∗], and it does not pay to deviate to a w>u ∗ since
β>0.
When θ = δ (or equivalently, η = α−β), the expected payoﬀ to a player that bids w =0
against a rival that employs F is












As above, since β>0, a player cannot gain by deviating to a w>u ∗. We conclude that F
is the unique symmetric equilibrium in this case.
Lemma 11 Suppose α − β 6=0 ,α =0and η 6=0 . Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium in nondegenerate mixed strategies.








for some K 6=0 . By hypothesis, β 6=0 . Suppose ﬁrst that β<0. Then there is no mass








But since β<0, this is a contradiction, since a player could improve his payoﬀ by bidding
above u.
Suppose next that β>0. If η>0 then once again there is no mass point by Lemma 3.
Hence, F (w)=0implies w = −V/η. But since −V/η <0, this is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose β>0 and η<0. Then
f (w)=K (V + ηw)
β−η







and hence w<−V/η. By Lemma 3, any mass point must be above the upper bound of the
absolutely continuous part of F. Setting F (w)=0in equation (16) implies the lower bound
of the distribution must be −V/η. But this is a contradiction, since by Lemma 3, the mass
p o i n tm u s tb el o c a t e da tt h i sp o i n t .
Case 2: α = β;η 6=0
Lemma 12 Suppose α = β>0 and η 6=0 . Then there exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as identiﬁed in Proposition 2.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the conditions of the Lemma imply θ 6= δ. Since α>0, Lemma 3
implies there are no mass points. Moreover, by Lemma 4, α>0 implies m =0 . Hence the






























], where we have used the fact η = θ − δ under the conditions

































. Since β>0, ap l a y e r
cannot gain by bidding above the upper bound of the support.
Lemma 13 Suppose α = β<0 and η 6=0 . Then there does not exist a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies there are no mass points, and hence equation (17) implies that, if












V +( θ − δ)x
V +( θ − δ)m
¶
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tη = θ − δ under the conditions stated. Since F (u)=1
implies u<∞, the support of F is bounded. But then F cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium
since a player can increase his expected payoﬀ by bidding above u, as β<0.
Lemma 14 Suppose α = β =0and η 6=0 . Then there does not exist a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Under the conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies
(V + ηw)f(w)=0
which contradicts the hypothesis that there is a nondegenerate mixed-strategy.
Case 3: α − β 6=0 ;η =0
Lemma 15 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 , and α<0. Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
36Proof. First, note that since η =0 , there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies
Vf(w) − α +( α − β)F(w)=0























If α<0, this is not a valid density and hence an equilibrium does not exist.
Lemma 16 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 , and α>0. Then if a symmetric equilibrium exists,
m =0and the distribution function is of the form in equation (19) with m =0 .
Proof. First, note that since η =0 ,t h e r ec a nb en om a s sp o i n tb yL e m m a3 .M o r e o v e r ,t h e
solution to the diﬀerential equation takes on the form in equation (19).S i n c eα>0, Lemma
4 implies m =0 .
Lemma 17 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 ,α>0 and β<0. Then there does not exist a
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 16, under this parameter conﬁguration F (x) ≤ α/(α − β) < 1 for all
x ≥ 0. Hence, F is not a valid distribution function.
Lemma 18 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 ,α>0 and β =0 . Then there exists a unique sym-
metric equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition
2.
Proof. First, note that since η =0 ,t h e r ec a nb en om a s sp o i n tb yL e m m a3 .U s i n gL e m m a









37Since this is an exponential distribution, with mean V/α, the expected payoﬀ to a player
that bids w =0against F is








and hence, EU (w)=EU (0) for all w ∈ [0,∞). Thus, player cannot proﬁtably deviate.
Lemma 19 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 , α>0 and β>0. Then there exists a unique sym-
metric equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition
2.
Proof. First, note that since η =0 , there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. By Lemma
16, the distribution must have the form in equation (19) with m =0 . Since β>0,t h i si sa






regardless of the sign of α − β.Ap l a y e r
that bids w =0against F earns an expected payoﬀ of


























w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tη =0implies α − β = δ − θ. Since β>0, a player cannot
gain by bidding above the upper bound of the support of F.
Lemma 20 Suppose η =0 , α − β 6=0 , and α =0 . Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Under the conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies
Vf(w) − βF(w)=0 .









Since η =0 , Lemma 3 implies there are no mass points. This contradicts the fact that
F (w) > 0 for all w ∈ [0,∞).T h u s , i f α =0and η =0 , there does not exist a non-
degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium when β>0 or β<0.
38Case 4: α − β =0 ;η =0
Lemma 21 Suppose η =0and α = β<0. Then there does not exist a symmetric equilib-
rium.
Proof. First, note that since η =0 , there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies






But since α<0, this is not a well-deﬁned density, a contradiction.
Lemma 22 Suppose η =0and α = β>0. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
and it is in nondegenerate mixed-strategies as characterized in Proposition 2.
Proof. First, note that since η =0 , there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies






















The expected payoﬀ to a player that bids w =0against F is









. Since β>0, it does not pay to bid above the
upper bound of the support, as doing so increases costs but not the probability of winning.
39Lemma 23 Suppose η =0 , α = β =0 ,a n dθ = δ 6=0 . Then there does not exist a
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that since η =0 , there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, diﬀerential equation (3) implies
Vf(w)=0 ,
or f (w)=0for all w. This is a contradiction.
Taken together, the above lemmas exhaustively describe all mixed-strategy equilibria
(and nonexistence) as summarized in Proposition 2.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Follows directly from reﬁning the partitions of the parameter space derived in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2.
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